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Corruption of public officials, in particular bribery, has long
been recognized as a potentially serious problem in every polity.
Large foreign corporations, based in developed jurisdictions, are
identified as common culprits. The first legislation in the world to
recognize and seek to curb the contribution of domestically based
corporations to foreign corruption was the U.S. Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act of 1977. The Act criminalizes the payment of bribes
to foreign officials for the purpose of obtaining or retaining
business. I analyze the efficacy of the Act, and argue that it has
had only limited success in curbing foreign bribery. This article
contributes to the existing literature by considering what impact
recent domestic and international developments will have on the
Act's likely future effectiveness. Specifically, it suggests that the
internationalization of anti-corruption efforts and recent increased
and expanded domestic enforcement reduce the potential costs to
business competitiveness and add new momentum to the Act's
effectiveness. The ultimate impact of these developments will
depend on the ongoing commitment of all parties to curb supply-
side corruption.
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I. Introduction
Corruption of public officials, and bribery in particular, has
long been recognized as a potentially serious problem in every
polity. The gods themselves are moved by gifts, wrote Euripides;
experience shows, elected and appointed officials whose positions
carry with them privilege or influence are often moved by gifts
too. Recent scandals embroiling numerous elected representatives
of the Republican Party in the United States and members of the
Labour government in the United Kingdom suggest corruption
remains prevalent in even the most developed nations.' Bribery is
also gaining increasing attention as a potential impediment to
economic development in less developed countries.
Much of the literature on the causes and consequences of
bribery focus on the demand side: the officials who request and
accept bribe payments in exchange for favor and influence.
Slowly, however, the literature has begun to address the supply-
side of bribery. Large foreign corporations, based in developed
jurisdictions, are identified as common culprits of supply-side
bribery.
The first legislation in the world to recognize and seek to curb
the contribution of domestically based corporations to foreign
corruption was the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977
(FCPA).2 This Act criminalizes the payment of bribes to foreign
officials for the purpose of obtaining or retaining business.
I See, e.g., Phillip Shenon, Lawmaker Admits He Took Illegal Gifts, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 16, 2006, at A10 (addressing the Jack Abramoff scandal); David Leppard, Robert
Winnett & Jon Ungoed-Thomas, The Great Escape, THE LONDON TIMES, July 22, 2007,
at 12 (addressing the "cash for honors" scandal and the non-prosecution of those
implicated).
2 15 U.S.C. § 78m-78ff (2000) (henceforth "FCPA" or "the Act").
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A large body of literature seeks to assess the effects of the
FCPA. It concerns itself, in particular, with two questions: has the
FCPA discouraged U.S. corporations from making corrupt foreign
payments, and at what cost to U.S. corporations' competitiveness
in overseas markets has any deterrent effect been achieved? In
this article, I analyze the efficacy of the FCPA by addressing both
questions. 'The existing literature, I argue, provides no consensus
but supports the view that the Act has had only limited success in
curbing foreign bribery. The article contributes to the existing
literature by considering what impact recent domestic and
international developments will have on the Act's likely future
effectiveness. Specifically, it suggests that the internationalization
of anti-corruption efforts and recent increased and expanded
domestic enforcement reduce the potential costs to business
competitiveness and add new momentum to the Act's
effectiveness. While concluding on an optimistic note, I argue that
the ultimate impact of these developments will depend on the
ongoing commitment of all parties to curb supply-side corruption.
A. Consequences of Bribery
Foreign bribery, and corruption more generally, have several
pernicious consequences for the receiving jurisdictions. A
substantial body of literature supports the observation that
corruption inhibits economic growth and identifies two primary
reasons for this outcome: economic inefficiency and reduced
investment..
Where there are no bribes, buyers will purchase from the seller
that offers the best in terms of both price and-quality. But a public
official accepting a bribe does not benefit directly from the
product or service whose purchase she authorizes. She may
therefore make decisions based on a calculus of personal income
maximization (from the bribe) rather than national welfare
maximization (from the purchase of the best product or service at
the lowest price).
This agency problem presents three principal consequences.
First, government funds may be misallocated towards inefficient
and overpriced contractors offering not the best supply at the
lowest cost, but instead the largest bribe.3 Put crudely, the state no
3 Daniel Pines, Amending the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act to Include a Private
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longer gets the biggest bang for its buck. Second, funds may be
misallocated toward marginal projects. Officials may prioritize
projects based on their potential to yield bribe payments rather
than public need.4  Third, if bribery is commonplace and firms
must regularly proffer bribes to win contracts, the private sector as
a whole may become less efficient as firms shift the focus of
expenditures away from investments to increase competitiveness
toward corrupt payments.5
Corruption may also impede economic growth due to
decreased investment. Foreign companies may be less willing to
invest capital in a market with endemic corruption. While some
studies find little evidence of a negative correlation between
corruption and investment,' the majority of empirical studies come
to the opposite conclusion. For example, Graf Lambsdorf finds
that a reduction in corruption from the level of Tanzania to that of
the U.K. would see net annual capital inflows increase by 3% of
Gross Domestic Product.7  Scholars Shang-Jin Wei, Moshin
Habib, and Leon Zurawicki reach similar conclusions.8
Foreign bribery can hurt those foreign corporations engaging
in the practice, and even those abstaining. Once a business has
paid a bribe, they are likely to have difficulty resisting demands
for further bribes in the future.9 Companies with a reputation for
Right ofAction, 82 CAL. L. REv. 185, 213 (1994).
4 Steven R. Salbu, Bribery in the Global Market: A Critical Analysis of the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 229, 252 (1997).
5 Patrick X. Delaney, Transnational Corruption: Regulation Across Borders 10-11
(Asia Pacific School of Economics and Government, Discussion Paper No. 05-15, 2005).
6 See David Wheeler & Ashoka Mody, International Investment Location
Decisions: The Case of U.S. Firms, 33 J. INT'L ECON. 57, 72 (1992); James R. Hines Jr.,
Forbidden Payment: Foreign Bribery and American Business After 1977 19-21 (Nat'l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 5266, 1995).
7 Johann Graf Lambsdorf, How Corruption Affects Economic Development, in
GLOBAL CORRUPTION REPORT 2004 310 (Transparency Int'l ed., Pluto Press 2004).
8 Shang-Jin Wei, How Taxing is Corruption on International Investors?, 82 REv.
ECON. & STAT. 1, 8 (2000); Moshin Habib & Leon Zurawicki, Corruption and foreign
direct investment, in GLOBAL CORRUPTION REPORT 2004 313, 313-15 (Transparency Int'l
ed., Pluto Press 2004).
9 See Xun Wu, Corporate Governance and Corruption: A Cross-Country
Analysis, 18 GOVERNANCE 151, 154 (2005); see generally SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN,
CORRUPTION AND GOVERNMENT: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, AND REFORM (1999) (studying
the effect of corruption on economies).
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paying bribes may be approached by officials for services that
would normally not attract payment. Moreover, an official who
knows payments have been made in the past can increase
bureaucratic interference to engender further bribes.'" Empirical
studies provide evidence of such flow on effects: Kaufmann and
Wei find that firms that pay more bribes face more bureaucratic
red tape."
II. The U.S. Response: the FCPA
The FCPA was passed by the U.S. Congress in December
1977 as a response to the Watergate scandal and to a Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) investigation that uncovered
over $300 million of questionable payments by U.S. firms to
foreign government officials.' 2 An SEC report listed some 527
companies which had disclosed such payments, including major
U.S. corporations such as Exxon Mobil, Boeing, Northrop
Grumman, Lockheed Martin, and Gulf Oil. 3
While analysis of the causes of corruption had previously
focused on the demand-side, specifically on problems of agency
and the motives for public officials to accept or exact bribe
payments, the SEC investigation revealed that supply-side actors,
particularly large foreign corporations, may be equally important
in explaining the promulgation of the practice. The resulting
legislation was the first in the world to recognize and seek to curb
the contribution of foreign firms.
The FCPA adopts a two prong approach to counter bribery,
based on separate accounting and penal provisions. The
accounting provisions focus on disclosure; it requires all
10 See Wu, supra note 9, at 154.
I i Daniel Kaufman & Shang-Jin Wei, Does "Grease Money" Speed Up the Wheels
of Commerce? 1-2 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7093, 2000).
12 See W. L. Larson, Effective Enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act,
32 STAN. L. REV. 561, n.] (1980); SEC, REPORT OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION ON QUESTIONABLE AND ILLEGAL CORPORATE PAYMENTS AND PRACTICES
(May 12, 1976), reprinted in Sec. Reg. & L. Rep (BNA), No. 353, Special Supplement
(May 19, 1976); see also Henry H. Rossbacher & Tracy W. Young, The Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act Within the American Response to Domestic Corruption, 15 DICK. J. INT'L
L. 509, 518 (1997) (citing $400 million in questionable payments).
13 See Larson, supra note 12, at n. 1; Business Without Bribes, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 19,
1979, at 63.
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corporations that have stock registered with the SEC to keep
accurate books and accounts of all transactions, and to adopt a
system of internal accounting controls.14
The anti-bribery provisions specifically prohibit U.S.
corporations and their agents from making payments to a foreign
official 5 in return for her influence to help the corporation "in
obtaining or retaining business."'' 6 These provisions apply to any
U.S. "issuer" or "domestic concern" as well as any official,
employee, agent, or other party acting on behalf of the issuer or
domestic concern.'
7
The Act has been amended twice, once in 1988 and again in
1998.18  The 1988 amendment was largely in response to
complaints by U.S. corporations that the original Act was too
vague and wide in scope. Originally, payments made to third
parties were only prohibited if a firm "[knew] or [has] reason to
know" that the payment would be used corruptly. 9 This was
amended to a narrower "knowing" standard which requires that a
guilty party is "aware" that the third party is engaging in such
conduct or that the conduct is "substantially certain to occur."2 °
The amendment also clarified the exemption of "grease" or
14 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(A)-(B) (2000).
15 A foreign official is "any officer or employee of a foreign government or any
department, agency, or instrumentality thereof, or of a public international organization,
or any person acting in an official capacity for or on behalf of any such government or
department, agency, or instrumentality." 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(f)(1) (2000); see also 78dd-
2(h)(2) (defining the same).
16 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a)(l) (2000); see also 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(a)(1)(2000) & 15
U.S.C § 78dd-3(a)(1)(2000) (defining the same).
17 See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(a) (2000) (relating to issuers); § 78dd-2(a)(2000)
(relating to domestic concerns); § 78dd-3(a)(2000) (relating to those other than issuers or
domestic concern but acting on their behalf). Issuers include any corporation under the
auspices of the SEC and domestic concerns refer to any U.S. citizen, national or resident
or "any corporation, partnership, association, joint-stock company, business trust,
unincorporated organization, or sole proprietorship" with its principal place of business
in the U.S. or organized under U.S. law. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(h)(1) (2000); see also 15
U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(2000).
IS See Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1419-1425 (1988) (1988 amendments); Pub.
L. No. 105-366, 105 Stat. 3302-3312 (1998) (1998 amendments).
19 See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(a)(3) (Supp. V 1981).
20 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(f)(2) (2000); see also 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(h)(3)(A)(2000) &
15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3(f)(3)(2000) (defining the same).
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"facilitating" payments. 2' Originally, payments were exempted if
they were for duties that are "essentially ministerial or clerical., 22
Payments are now exempt when used "to expedite or to secure the
performance of a routine governmental action. 23  Finally, the
amendment also introduced several affirmative defenses.
Payments are exempt if they are legal under the laws of the
receiving official's country or if the payment is for "a reasonable
and bona fide expenditure," such as travel and lodging expenses.24
The FCPA was again amended in 1998 when section 78dd-3
was added, which extends the Act's purview to "any person" over
which the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) has jurisdiction. The
SEC is responsible for enforcing the accounting requirements,
while the SEC and DOJ share responsibility for enforcing the anti-
bribery provisions.25
A. Thirty Years Later: Effects of the FCPA
1. Impact on U.S. Business Abroad
A claim made repeatedly by various U.S. commentators,
politicians, and business leaders since the FCPA's inception is that
it creates a lopsided playing field. Within a market occupied
completely by U.S. corporations, the Act would apply to all
competitors, and should not affect firms' relative profitability. But
in reality, U.S. businesses compete in overseas markets with
foreign counterparts not subject to the Act, and thus free to pay
bribes. In markets where payments are common, U.S. firms may
be precluded altogether from competing.26 At the very least, it is
argued, U.S. businesses operate abroad at a significant competitive
21 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(b) (2000); see also 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(b)(2000) & 15
U.S.C. § 78dd-3(b)(2000) (defining the same)..
22 See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(b) (Supp. V 1981).
23 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(b) (2000); see also 15 U.S.C § 78dd-2(b)(2000) & 15 U.S.C.
§ 78dd-3(b)(2000) (defining the same).
24 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(c) (2000); see also 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(c)(2000) & 15 U.S.C.
§78dd-3(c)(2000) (defining the same).
25 See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3 (2000).
26 Indeed, some business leaders have claimed that in some countries bribes are
"essential" for obtaining business. See P. Beck et al., The Impact of the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act on US Exports, 12 MANAGERIAL AND DECISION EcON. 295, 295 (1991).
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disadvantage.27
Business leaders have been outspoken in voicing such fears.
Two years after adoption of the law, 71% of respondent executives
of multinational companies thought U.S. companies would lose
business to foreign competitors as a direct result of the Act.28
Some politicians sympathized with this view, with one Senator
describing the FCPA "as an export disincentive. 2 9 A 2002 survey
of business attitudes by the Control Risks Group indicates that
such views remain prevalent among business leaders.3°
A number of empirical studies suggest the FCPA has led to a
substantial loss of business or export opportunities to foreign
competitors by U.S. companies operating abroad. One early study
by the U.S. Department of Commerce surveyed Foreign Services
posts, and found twenty-one embassies reporting that the Act was
an export disincentive in the countries in which they were
located.3" In 1981, a General Accounting Office study looked at
250 U.S. firms and found that 30% reported losses of foreign
business as a result of the Act.32 More recently, a 1995 Central
Intelligence Agency report estimated that from 1994-95, the U.S.
lost $36 billion in international business to bribe-paying
international competitors.
33
Other studies, by way of contrast, dispute these findings. One
Scholar John Graham finds no evidence that the U.S. share of
exports to bribery prone countries declined after the Act's
27 See Scott P. Boylan, Organized Crime in Russia: Implications for U.S. and
International Law, 19 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1999, 2015-2022 (1996).
28 Jack G. Kaikati & Wayne A. Label, American Bribery Legislation: An Obstacle
to International Marketing, 44 J. MARKETING 38, 42 (1980).
29 Senator Dixon quoted in Bill Shaw, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: A Legal and
Moral Analysis, 7 J. Bus. ETHICS 789, 792 (1988).
30 John Bray, International Business Attitudes Toward Corruption, in GLOBAL
CORRUPTION REPORT 2004 316 (2004).
31 See Beck et al., supra note 26, at 295.
32 COMPTROLLER GEN., REPORT TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES: IMPACT
OF FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT ON U.S. BUSINESS 15 (General Accounting Office,
1981).
33 Jon Moran, Bribery and Corruption: the OECD Convention on Combating the
Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, 8 BuS.
ETHICS 141, 142 (1999); see generally Hines, supra note 6, and Johann Graf Lambsdorf,
An Empirical Investigation of Bribery in International Trade, in CORRUPTION AND
DEVELOPMENT 40 (M. Robinson ed., Frank Cass 1998).
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enactment, and another Scholar, Mary Jane Sheffet reports survey
data from U.S. corporations indicating the Act has not hurt U.S.
business abroad or demand for U.S. products.34 Between 1986 and
1995, the U.S. share of export trade in Asia actually increased
from 20% to 31%. In Africa, between 1991 and 1996, the U.S.
share grew by 70%."5 Interestingly, exports appear to have grown
faster in markets where corrupt practices are reported to be
particularly prevalent - aircraft, construction equipment, oil and
gas field machinery, telecommunications equipment, and medical
equipment - than in markets less exposed to corruption.36
Against those studies finding a negative impact on U.S.
business, other less quantifiable advantages also need to be
considered. First, by forcing U.S. corporations to comply with
anti-bribery laws, the FCPA may have made these businesses
stronger competitors. In order to win contracts without paying
bribes, companies have needed to focus on the quality of their
services and products. An increase in quality will result in flow on
benefits for operations in non-corrupt markets.37
Second, the FCPA may have helped companies by providing
an excuse not to pay bribes. James Kinnear, former president of
Texaco, has suggested that the FCPA allows companies to save
face while refusing to pay bribes, and thus insulates companies
from the costs of bribery. 38 Colgate-Palmolive cited the FCPA and
its prohibition of bribery in response to demands for bribes from
Chinese officials regarding the construction of a factory.3 9 The
factory ultimately opened in 1992 without the payment of bribes.4 °
Empirical studies have differed in the time periods analyzed,
34 John Graham, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: A New Perspective, 15 J.
INT'L Bus. STUD. 107, 111 (1984); Mary Jane Sheffet, The Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act and the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988: Did They Change
Corporate Behavior? 14 J. OF PUB. POL'Y & MARKETING 290, 297 (1995).
35 Wesley Cragg & William Woof, The U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: A
Study of Its Effectiveness, 107 Bus. & Soc'Y REv. 98, 99 (2002).
36 Id.
37 Lisa H. Randall, Multilateralization of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 6
MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 657, 675 (1997); see also Wu, supra note 9, at 154.
38 James Kinnear, The Ethics of International Business: Foreign Policy and
Economic Sanctions, 61 VITAL SPEECHES 561, 562 (1995).
39 Rossbacher & Young, supra note 12, at 530.
40 Id.
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the metric used to measure the Act's impact, and the conclusions
reached.41 While there were almost certainly some instances
where U.S. corporations did not pay bribes and lost business to
bribe-paying overseas competitors, the magnitude of this negative
effect can be expected to differ from country to country,
depending on the pervasiveness of corruption in a particular
market. On balance, there is no conclusive evidence that U.S.
business interests have suffered overwhelmingly.
2. Impact on the Incidence of Bribery
While fears that the FCPA would undermine the
competitiveness of U.S. firms appear exaggerated, although not
necessarily unfounded, there is also little evidence that the FCPA
has had a particularly chilling effect on bribery by U.S.
corporations.42 Empirical data on the incidence of bribery are
difficult to acquire given the illegality and secrecy surrounding the
practice. While the majority of bribe payments probably go
undiscovered, the number of instances of bribery reported remains
high,43 and prosecutions under the FCPA are actually increasing.'
Further evidence that the foreign bribery remains widespread
amongst U.S. businesses comes from the World Bank, where in
one study, Hellman et al. examined twenty-two Eastern European
and former Soviet transition economies. 45 Their data suggest that
the FCPA has not led to higher standards of business practice in
these countries.46 Specifically, they report in another study that
41 Many rely simply on the business community's perceptions of the Act's effects,
particularly those finding a negative effect on U.S. business competitiveness. See
generally Pines, supra note 3, for a critique of the empirical literature.
42 The two observations may be linked - corporations continuing to use corrupt
practices are unlikely to experience any impact on their business competitiveness in
foreign markets.
43 See, e.g., Peter S. Goodman, Common in China, Kickbacks Create Trouble for
U.S. Companies at Home, WASH. POST, Aug. 22, 2005, at Al (reporting on payments by
U.S. companies in China).
44 This may be due, in part, to increased enforcement.
45 J. S. Hellman et al., Far From Home: Do Foreign Investors Import Higher
Standards of Governance in Transition Economies? (Aug., 2002) (unpublished Policy
Research Working Paper, available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract id=386900).
46 Id. at 21.
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foreign .direct investment (FDI) originating in the U.S. is not
characterized by "higher standards of corporate ethics than
domestic firms or FDI originating in other countries. 47 Indeed, a
higher percentage of U.S. firms pay public procurement kickbacks
(over 40%) in the countries analyzed than do firms based in
France, Japan, Germany, and the U.K.48
Another telling measure not limited to business activities in
transition economies is Transparency International's Bribe Payers
Index. The index ranks the world's leading exporting countries by
the (perceived) propensity of their companies to bribe abroad. The
1999 index ranked the U.S. ninth out of nineteen countries (a
lower ranking corresponds with higher levels of bribery), twenty-
two years after the enactment of the FCPA and at a time when
most other leading exporters were only beginning to implement
similar domestic legislation.49 Three years later, the 2002 index
put the U.S. thirteenth out of twenty-one countries.5 ° The most
recent 2006 index, which includes in its sample thirty countries,
places the U.S. ninth, equal with Belgium."
3. Waxing and Waning Enforcement
The limited impact of the FCPA on the incidence of bribery
may be explained, in part, by its limited enforcement. In its first
two decades, enforcement of the Act by the DOJ and SEC was, at
best, sporadic, and limited to high profile investigations. The fight
against corruption took a backburner to more pressing Cold War
era foreign policy concerns.
Early in the FCPA's life, the DOJ instructed U.S. attorneys to
only pursue bribery investigations with "express approval" from
Washington. 2 There existed serious concern that enforcement of
the Act would potentially offend or embarrass officials in allied
countries. 3 It was not until 1986 that a case involving a major
47 J.S. Hellman et al., Are Foreign Investors and Multinationals Engaging in
Corrupt Practies in Transition Economies? TRANSITION 4, 6 (World Bank, 2000).
48 Id. at 6, figure 4.
49 TRANSPARENCY INT'L, BRIBE PAYERS SURVEY 1999 2 (1999).
5o TRANSPARENCY INT'L, BRIBE PAYERS INDEX 2002 1 (2002).
51 TRANSPARENCY INT'L, BRIBE PAYERS INDEX 2006 4 (2006).
52 Larson, supra note 12, at 569.
53 Id. at 569-70.
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corporation, Ashland Oil, Inc., reached the courts, and this was
only the third action brought under the Act by the SEC.54 As of
1997, only seventeen companies and thirty-three individuals had
been charged under FCPA55 and numerous commentators were
bemoaning the paucity of prosecutions.56
There have been some important developments over the
intervening decade, however. The Ashland Oil case was the first
to involve what was ostensibly a legitimate business transaction
(the company had overpaid for an acquisition from an entity
controlled by a foreign government official in return for access to
cheap crude oil) and suggested that enforcing agencies were
willing to look, in judging the legality of a business transaction, at
its form as well as its actual substance.57 A 1995 prosecution of
the Lockheed Corporation led to $24 million in fines for a $1
million bribe, and a prison sentence for one company executive.58
The penalties imposed on Lockheed were some of the highest ever
under the FCPA.5 9
Enforcement actions by domestic agencies appear to be on the
increase and the prosecutions undertaken in the last few years
suggest that the SEC and DOJ are becoming serious about tackling
overseas bribery. There were seven major investigations by the
SEC and DOJ in 2002 and sixteen in 2004.60
Importantly, both the enforcing agencies and courts appear to
be taking an expansive approach to interpreting the reach of the
FCPA in terms of its threshold requirement that a bribe be
54 Shaw, supra note 29, at 789-90.
55 Rossbacher & Young, supra note 12, at 530.
56 See, e.g., Jack G. Kaikati et al., The Price of International Business Morality:
Twenty Years Under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 26 J. Bus. ETHICS 213, 215-16
(2000).
57 SEC v. Ashland Oil, Inc. 3 Foreign Corrupt Prac. Act Rep. CD-ROM 697.06
(D.D.C. 1986) (final order).
58 United States v. Lockheed Corp., 3 Foreign Corrupt Prac. Act Rep. CD-ROM
699.175 (N.D. Ga. 1994 (press release and criminal indictment)).
59 Company News, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 1995, at 35; see also Tipton F. McCubbins,
Somebody Kicked the Sleeping Dog-New Bite in the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 44
Bus. HORIZONS 27, 27 (2001).
60 Henry H. Rossbacher, The Business of Corruption, or is the Business of Business
Corruption? 13 J. FIN. CRIME 202, 203 (2006).
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incurred "in obtaining or retaining business.' In United States v.
Kay, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit concluded a
payment to reduce a company's customs duty and sales tax burden
constituted an illegal bribe under the terms of the provision.62
Some legal professionals suggest the Act's prohibition may now
extend to "virtually any government action that may be favorable
to a company.,
63
In the twenty-four months after the Kay ruling, the SEC
brought more FCPA enforcement actions than in any previous
two-year period since 1977.64 In some respects the SEC and
DOJ's enforcement programs appear to be more aggressive than
ever before, as claimed by then SEC Enforcement Director,
Stephen Cutler, in a speech in late 2004.65 However, at the same
time there appears to be a shift from criminal prosecution to civil
settlements.66 The Statoil case is particularly interesting as it is the
first enforcement under the FCPA against a foreign company with
no U.S. operations. Statoil is a Norwegian, publicly-traded (and
61 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(a)(1) (2000); see also 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(a)(1) & 15 U.S.C.
§ 78dd-3(a)(l) (defining the same).
62 The Court of Appeals ruled that bribes to lower taxes can reduce operating costs
and provide "an unfair advantage over competitors and thereby be of assistance to the
payer in obtaining or retaining business". U.S. v. Kay, 359 F.3d. 738, 749 (5th Cir.
2004). See also HECTOR GONZALEZ & CLAUDIUS 0. SOKENU, FOREIGN CORRUPT
PRACTICES ACT ENFORCEMENT AFTER U.S. v. KAY (Washington Legal Foundation 2006),
available at http://www.mayerbrownrowe.com/litigation/publications/
article.asp?id=3047&nid=258.
63 InVision Non-Prosecution Agreement with DOJ and Proposed Settlement with
SEC Demonstrate Importance of Compliance with Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, CORP.
& SEC. L. UPDATE at 3 (Fenwick & West LLP 2005).
64 GONZALEZ & SOKENU, supra note 62, at 2.
65 Id. at 15.
66 See SEC v. Titan Corp., Civ. No. 05-0411 (D.D.C. 2005), available at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/compl9107.pdf (concerning payments made in
Benin); SEC v. GE InVision, 5 Foreign Corrupt Prac. Act Rep. 699.9197 (N.D. Cal.
2005) (Exchange Act release and litigation release) (concerning payments made in
China, the Philippines and Thailand); SEC v. Monsanto Co., Exchange Act Release No.
5 Foreign Corrupt Prac. Act Rep. 699.9167 (D.D.C. 2005) (litigation release)
(concerning payments made in Indonesia); SEC v. Schering-Plough Corp., Exchange Act
Release No. 1:04CV00945, http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/comp18740.pdf
(June 9, 2004) (concerning payments made in Poland); In re Statoil, ASA, Exchange Act
Release No. 54599, http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2006/34-54599.pdf (Oct. 13,
2006) (concerning payments made in Iran).
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partially government-owned) company, but because its shares are
traded on the New York Stock Exchange, it falls under the
jurisdiction of the FCPA.67
Observers have noted that the DOJ and SEC appear to be
increasing both the scope and intensity of their investigations.68
These agencies are also obtaining increasingly high penalties. The
penalty imposed on Titan, a combined civil and criminal penalty
of $28.5 million, was the largest ever for a violation of the
FCPA.69 Voluntary disclosure of corrupt acts will also evidently
not exempt companies from penalties, as indicated by the Titan
and GE In Vision cases.7°
The 1988 amendment to the FCPA expanded its purview to
include overseas based subsidiaries of U.S. companies. The
Schering-Plough case, among others, indicates that the DOJ and
SEC are committed to holding U.S. companies accountable for the
actions of their subsidiaries.71 This is important because, in the
early years of the FCPA, numerous U.S. companies sought to
shield themselves from the Act by reorganizing distribution
networks through such subsidiaries. 72 The Statoil case suggests
the SEC and DOJ are also expanding their efforts against foreign
companies, even those with no actual U.S. operations.73
The SEC also appears to be regularly seeking, in addition to
large monetary penalties, the disgorgement of profits gained
through corrupt practices. Additionally, the agency routinely
insists on the violating company's appointment of an independent
consultant to monitor that company's ongoing compliance with the
FCPA for an SEC-selected minimum number of years.74
It remains to be seen if the enforcement momentum will be
maintained. In the past three years, there appears to have been a
67 See In re Statoil, Exchange Act Release No. 54599, at 2-6.
68 See, e.g., McCubbins, supra note 59 (noting the recent increase in enforcement
of FCPA).
69 F. Joseph Warin & Jason A. Monahan, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Due
Diligence and Voluntary Disclosure, 1 J. PAYMENT Sys. L. 425, 429 (2005).
70 See id.
71 See SEC v. Schering-Plough Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 1:04CV00945.
72 Kaikati & Label, supra note 28, at 40.
73 See In re Statoil, supra note 67, at 2-6.
74 GONZALEZ & SOKENU, supra note 62, at 27.
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shift away from prosecution with the aim of punishment for
violations to the use of deferred prosecution agreements. The
agreements provide for the suspension of proceedings provided a
corporation prima facie guilty of violating the FCPA complies
with a number of commitments commonly including payment of a
fine, reform, of operations and compliance programs, and
appointment of an independent consultant to monitor
compliance. 75 If, after an agreed period of time, the company has
fulfilled its obligations, the charges are dismissed. Some
commentators suggest this may simply allow corporations to
sidestep being held accountable for corrupt practices; Rossbacher
argues that "corporations with deep pockets and sophisticated
defense counsel could buy their way out., 76 On the other hand, it
could be argued the arrangements achieve all the objectives of the
FCPA legislation without the need for costly litigation.
B. Internationalizing Anti-Foreign Bribery Efforts
The internationalization of the anti-corruption effort has long
been heralded by U.S. commentators as the key to bolstering anti-
bribery efforts. If the FCPA has hurt U.S. business abroad, it has
done so by placing a fetter on U.S. corporations competing with
bribe-paying foreign competitors. The contribution of large
business to the corruption of foreign governments has only
gradually gained international recognition. The first multilateral
convention targeting corruption was signed by members of the
Organization of American States in 1996.77 The following year,
the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
adopted a similar convention (ratified by all members as of 2001)
which commits member states to criminalize the bribery of foreign
public officials.78 The fight against corruption became truly
multilateral with the 2003 United Nations Convention Against
Corruption.79 This Convention seeks to "promote, facilitate and
75 J. K. Robinson, et al., Deferred Prosecutions and the Independent Monitor, 2
INT'L. J. DISCLOSURE & GOVERNANCE 325, 326 (2005)
76 Rossbacher, supra note 60, at 206.
77 OAS Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, Mar. 29, 1996, OAS Doc.
B-58, 35 I.L.M. 724.
78 OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Officials in International Business
Transactions, Dec. 18, 1997, OECD Doc. DAFFE/IME/BR(97)20, 37 I.L.M. 1.
79 UN Convention Against Corruption, Dec. 9, 2003, UN Doc. A/58/422, 43 I.L.M.
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support international cooperation and technical assistance in the
prevention of and fight against corruption." 80
Il. Looking Forward: Problems Still Exist
Despite the evident advances in FCPA enforcement and the
gradual internationalization of anti-bribery efforts, impediments to
the Act's effectiveness remain. The most obvious problem which
plagues any anti-bribery legislation is that of defining exactly what
constitutes a bribe and, furthermore, determining whether a
payment falls under that definition.8'
Further confusion surrounds distinctions between bribes and
mere "facilitating" or "grease" payments. The FCPA, as amended
in 1988, specifically exempts these payments, defined as "any
facilitating or expediting payment to a foreign official, political
party, or party official the purpose of which is to expedite or to
secure the performance of a routine governmental action by a
foreign official, political party, or party official., 82  Examples of
37 [hereinafter UN Convention]. As of April, 2007, the Convention has 140 signatories
and 91 ratifications or accessions. See UN Office on Drugs and Crime, UN Convention
Signatories, available at http://www.unodc.org/unodc/crime-signatures-corruption.html
(last visited Apr. 11, 2007).
80 Id. art. l.
81 The Australian Wheat Board (AWB) was the biggest payer of kickbacks to the
Iraqi government under the UN Oil-for-Food Programme. INDEPENDENT INQUIRY
COMMITrEE INTO THE UNITED NATIONS OIL-FOR-FOOD PROGRAMME, REPORT ON THE
MANIPULATION OF THE OIL-FOR-FOOD PROGRAMME BY THE IRAQI REGIME 313 (Oct. 27,
2005), available at http://www.iic-offp.org/story27octO5.htm (last visited Oct. 21, 2007).
An Australian Royal Commission found the AWB had deliberately overpaid for phoney
transport charges. Id. Commissioner Cole found, however, that the kickbacks did not
constitute bribes under Australian law as they were paid to the Iraqi ruling regime and
not individual officials. Id. See generally T.R.H. COLE, REPORT OF THE INQUIRY INTO
CERTAIN AUSTRALIAN COMPANIES IN RELATION TO THE UN OIL-FOR-FOOD PROGRAMME
(Commonwealth of Australia 2006), available at http://www.offi.gov.au/agd/WWW/
unoilforfoodinquiry.nsf/Page/Report (last visited Oct. 21, 2007). Presumably, payments
directly enriching one Iraqi official rather than the entire government would have been
bribes. The FCPA, like the Australian legislation, defines bribes as payments
specifically to foreign officials. It has not been tested by an AWB-style challenge and it
is unclear how such payments would be treated by the courts. A recent case involving
payments by El Paso, a U.S. gas pipeline operator, under the Oil-for-Food Programme,
was settled with the DOJ and SEC. Warren Hodge, Pipeline Firm to Pay Fine to Settle
Iraq Allegations, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Feb. 7, 2007, available at
http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/02/07/business/elpaso.php (last visited Oct. 21, 2007)..
82 See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(b) (2000); see also 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(b)(2000) & 15
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routine governmental action set out in the Act include: providing
telecommunications services, unloading cargo, providing police
protection, processing visas, and obtaining permits.83
There remains some ambiguity as to what will constitute
routine governmental action in different national settings,
particularly where the distinction between public and private
officials is not necessarily entirely obvious. 84 Corporations may
seek to disguise bribes in the form of facilitating payments which
are then passed onto the ministerial recipient. There is little case
law and few judicial decisions clarifying the exact legal
parameters of such practices.
A final problem of definition stems from cultural differences.
Salbu argues that bribery is essentially a cultural construct, unlike
murder, which is universally recognized as morally unacceptable. 86
Bribery, or what the FCPA defines as bribery, is not clearly wrong
in all cultures. 87 What is viewed as an unethical bribe or conflict
of interest in America may simply be an accepted part of etiquette
in, for example, Japan.88
While many cultures do have traditions of gift-giving, the type
of corruption that international corporations are engaged in is
typically on a grander scale. The adoption of FCPA-like
legislation by signatories of the OECD and U.N. Conventions
supports the view that preference-seeking bribery is widely, if not
universally, condemned. Nonetheless, the fact that gift-giving,
especially in business transactions, is a widespread practice
contributes further uncertainty to the problem of identifying when
U.S.C. § 78dd-3(b)(2000).
83 See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(f)(3) (2000); see also 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(h)(4)(2000) &
15 U.S.C.§ 78dd-3(f(4)(2000) (defining the same).
84 For much of Taiwan's history, for instance, the Kuomintang operated as both
ruling political party and "as a huge corporate interest, controlling banks, manufacturing
and service concerns." Moran, supra note 33, at 144.
85 Rossbacher & Young, supra note 12, at 525.
86 Salbu, supra note 4, at 276.
87 Id. at 275; Steven. R. Salbu, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act as a Threat to
Global Harmony, 20 MICH. J. INT'L L. 419, 422-29 (1999).
88 Salbu, supra note 4, at 277-287; See also Joongi Kim & Jong Bum Kim,
Cultural Differences in the Crusade Against International Bribery: Rice-Cake Expenses
in Korea and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 6 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y. J. 549, 578-79
(1997).
2007]
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
a payment is in fact a bribe.
Another problem lies with enforcement, both by the U.S. and
by other countries. While the OECD and U.N. Conventions are
promising, and even if all countries were to implement legislation
roughly equivalent to the FCPA, it is unclear whether the
enforcing agencies in each country would approach their task with
equal zeal or comiitment. Additionally, it is difficult to gauge the
extent to which governments merely pay lip service to
international agreements. Indeed, national governments seeking to
further the interests of their countries' businesses operating abroad
may seek to help, or at least not hinder, their potentially
corruption-assisted competitiveness.8 9 It is certainly questionable
how serious some convention signatories take their commitments.
Most recently, political expedience came before Britain's
obligations under the OECD Convention when their Attorney
General halted an investigation into alleged bribery by BAE
Systems.90 In addition, a number of other OECD countries,
including Italy and France, continue to rank poorly on
Transparency International's Bribe Payers Index. 91
IV. Conclusions
The FCPA has raised the public profile of corruption and
bribery. U.S. companies have not been able to simply ignore the
Act and it has arguably been responsible for increasing political
pressure to pursue multilateral conventions. Increased
international awareness has also encouraged many developing
countries to address the demand-side of bribery, with Argentina,
Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Mexico, Romania,
Uruguay, and Venezuela all taking steps in recent years to tackle
corruption.92
The secretive nature of bribery makes it difficult to know
89 The U.S. government has in the past allegedly explicitly helped U.S. companies
compete abroad. Moran cites claims that the NSA listened into telephone calls and lifted
facsimiles between European consortium Airbus and the Saudi national airline by
tapping into a commercial communication satellite. Moran, supra note 33, at 145.
9o David Leigh & Rob Evans, Blair Forced Goldsmith to Drop BAE Charges,
GUARDIAN, Feb. 1, 2007, at 1, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/
frontpage/story/O,,2003259,00.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2007).
91 TRANSPARENCY INT'L, BRIBE PAYERS 2006, supra note 51, at 4.
92 Randall, supra note 37, at 681, n. 113.
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exactly what impact the Act has had on foreign bribery. There is a
more easily identified basis for measuring the Act's effect on U.S.
overseas business and trade. While there may be a degree of
validity to concerns that the legislation is having some chilling
effect on business, the inconclusiveness of empirical studies
suggests that more dramatic claims by some business leaders may
be exaggerated.
Recent, developments are promising. The internationalization
of anti-bribery efforts, in the form of multilateral conventions,
while only slowly beginning, should reduce the potential harmful
effects of the FCPA on U.S. business and reduce the incentive for
U.S. corporations to pay bribes. The more aggressive approach to
enforcement by U.S. agencies increases the likelihood of being
caught and, as a corollary, the potential costs of breaching the Act.
Has the FCPA actually made U.S. businesses more ethical?
There is certainly a risk that aggressive enforcement of the FCPA
simply forces companies to resort to more sophisticated methods
of hiding payments, pushing bribery further underground. While
the recent rise in high profile bribery cases suggests the practice
remains widespread, it may be overly pessimistic to conclude there
is "a general acceptance of lawlessness."93
The drafters of the FCPA were not so naive to think that
criminalization of foreign bribery would make it anathema for
U.S. corporations. The Act merely introduced new costs into
corporations' cost-benefit analyses of their business practices.
Both compliance and non-compliance with the Act carry with
them costs. On the one hand, the cost of compliance includes that
of following the internal auditing requirements and monitoring the
behavior of employees and subsidiaries, as well as that of any
business lost to bribe-paying competitors. On the other hand, the
cost of non-compliance includes fines and criminal penalties if
caught and damage to a firm's reputation.
If foreign governments can be convinced to follow through
with their commitments to stamp out the corrupt practices of their
nationally based businesses, the risk of losing business to bribe-
paying competitors should decrease. At the same time, as recent
cases suggest, the risk of incurring costs for non-compliance are
increasing. It remains to be seen, though, how serious both U.S.
93 Rossbacher, supra note 60, at 204.
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enforcing agencies and foreign governments are about tackling
corruption in the long-term. Meanwhile, corporations will
continue to seek out new loopholes and cost minimization devices
such as deferred prosecution agreements. And when the largest
penalty ever imposed for foreign bribery is only $28.5 million,
large corporations may still consider bribery a prudent business
practice and fines a worthwhile risk.
